

TOP SECRET

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

8 NOV 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Albert C. Hall
Assistant Secretary (Intelligence)
Department of Defense

SUBJECT : Indications and Warning of Soviet
Attack in Europe

REFERENCES : A. Your Memorandum, Same Subject,
dated 9 October 1975

B. NIE 11-14-75: "Warsaw Pact Forces
Opposite NATO," Issued on 4 September
1975

1. Your 9 October memorandum expresses a continuing concern, which I certainly share, regarding the intelligence problem of spotting indications and providing timely warning of any Soviet attack in Europe. As you know, this problem has been and is the focus of continuing efforts on the part of various components of the Intelligence Community.

2. This was a problem to which those who worked on the recently issued NIE 11-14-75 devoted considerable attention. Indeed, one of that Estimate's principal judgments (stated on its page 4) is that:

"The Soviet military evidently believes that Pact ground forces are superior to NATO's. They also believe that Pact theater forces now in Central Europe are not only capable of

TOP SECRET

Copy No. 8

containing a NATO attack in the early days of a conflict, but are also capable of conducting a non-nuclear offensive into West Germany."

As you will recall from the discussion at the USIB meeting at which NIE 11-14-75 was considered, this judgment was reviewed in some detail by the USIB principals. The only reservation expressed was that of the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State, who took a footnote; as I read it, however, his footnote was prompted by his estimate of the conservative nature of the Soviet leadership and not by any reservation over the accuracy of the Community's depiction of Soviet capabilities. The thoughts behind the judgment of those present capabilities, and the rationale supporting it, are elaborated in paragraphs 82-91 of the Estimate proper.

3. There are several other items mentioned in your memorandum which I believe require some clarification and which I would like to discuss before turning to your actual recommendations:

- a. The memorandum speaks of a "growing agreement that the Soviets are stressing the development of capabilities for attack without significant prior reinforcement of the GSFG." As noted above, the Community's judgment -- as reflected in the recently issued NIE -- is that the Soviets have already developed such capabilities and, hence, that Soviet actions are keyed more to enhancing these capabilities than to creating them.
- b. Your memorandum argues that "additional data and analysis are needed in the development of a broadly based Intelligence Community position on the details of a Soviet/Warsaw Pact capability to initiate an unreinforced attack against NATO." It seems to me, that the National Intelligence Estimate in which the USIB has concurred is itself a "broadly based Intelligence Community position." As for the details, I believe they are available in the agencies which participated in the NIE, and that further community review of this degree of detail would be of questionable value. If DOD

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/12/21 : CIA-RDP91M00696R000600150007-8

elements would need additional data, it would seem that they can readily be provided by those parts of the Defense Intelligence Projections for Planning (DIPP) which have Community endorsement, plus the material covered in the US-only version of MC 161/76, which is now in an early stage of development.

- c. Your 9 October memorandum speaks of a perceived need for "full documentation of the evidential base for such [Soviet] plans and capabilities." The documentation, in large measure, is already available, though circulating it to a wide audience creates serious problems. As you know, much of the most significant evidence used is derived from extremely sensitive sources which have to be protected. Consequently, this actual evidence has received and must continue to receive only limited and controlled distribution.
- d. The judgments the Community has made with respect to Warsaw Pact force capabilities for launching an offensive without additional prior reinforcement from the Soviet Union have been the subject of considerable USIB discussion, during which the principals concerned have had ample opportunity to express their disagreements and to criticize or question the evidence supporting these judgments. The meetings of the USIB representatives, who developed the draft of NIE 11-14-75 which the USIB itself considered, were very free-swinging and provided ample opportunity for vigorous debate among knowledgeable experts from throughout the Community. I would submit, therefore, that those judgments which were embodied in the final Estimate have already been thoroughly and objectively critiqued both by the USIB itself and by analysts at the working level representing their own views and those of their respective USIB principals. I, therefore, wonder what purpose would truly be served by having others take yet another look at this assessment.

Approved For Release 2004/12/21 : CIA-RDP91M00696R000600150007-8

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

4. Your 9 October memorandum suggests that a further study of this material, focused on its indications and warning implications, should be undertaken by the Strategic Warning Staff. Certainly the indications and warning implications of the Warsaw Pact capabilities are of major concern to the Staff. Because, however, the detailed study you propose reaches into so many parts of the Community and the principal focus of its effort would seem to deal more with estimative problems rather than those of warning, I would think it better to keep this in the National Intelligence Estimate context.

5. The development of net assessments is a task to which the Intelligence Community can and should make an input, though comprehensive net assessments -- strictly defined -- require the inclusion of data about US plans and capabilities which are beyond the US Intelligence Community's purview. NIE 11-14 covers Warsaw Pact capabilities in considerable detail but is not, and does not pretend to be, a full-blown net assessment. Actually, the data on NATO allies, so vital to a comprehensive net assessment (no matter who does it) are less than satisfactory. This is a problem well known to all of us in the Intelligence Community, a problem specifically addressed in Question 29 of the 1975 set of Key Intelligence Questions and, again, as KIQ 32 in the FY 1976 series.

25X1 6. None of this is to say, of course, that further work on this important subject is unnecessary. On the contrary, I share your sense of the need for further work and am already encouraging my associates to undertake it. It seems to me that the National Intelligence Officer for Conventional Forces [redacted] is in the best position to stimulate and guide the necessary Community-wide staff work on this critical subject.

7. I have already asked [redacted] to be prepared to discuss this matter further with you or with any members of your own staff to whom you may care to assign this problem.

25X1

Wesley Bill

W. E. Colby

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/12/21 : CIA-RDP91M00696R000600150007-8

SUBJECT: Indications and Warning of Soviet
Attack in Europe

Distribution:

Copy 1 - The Hon. Albert C. Hall

2 - DCI

3 - DDCI

4 - ER

5 - D/DCI/IC

6 - IC Staff

7 - DDI

✓ 8 - D/DCI/NIO

9 - NIO/CF Subject File

10 - NIO/CF DCI File

11 - NIO/CF Chrono

12 - NIO/RI

25X1

25X1

NIO/CF:DEB:jmj/

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/12/21 : CIA-RDP91M00696R000600150007-8

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/12/21 : CIA-RDP91M00696R000600150007-8

Approved For Release 2004/12/21 : CIA-RDP91M00696R000600150007-8

D/DC 1/1010

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

Approved For Release 2004/12/21 : CIA-RDP91M00696R0006015000

UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Chairman, USIB "		
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			

<input type="checkbox"/> ACTION	<input type="checkbox"/> DIRECT REPLY	<input type="checkbox"/> PREPARE REPLY
<input type="checkbox"/> APPROVAL	<input type="checkbox"/> DISPATCH	<input type="checkbox"/> RECOMMENDATION
<input type="checkbox"/> COMMENT	<input type="checkbox"/> FILE	<input type="checkbox"/> RETURN
<input type="checkbox"/> CONCURRENCE	<input type="checkbox"/> INFORMATION	<input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE

Remarks:

Attached is a copy of the letter from Dr. Hall on "Indications and Warning of Soviet Attack in Europe," which was mentioned at yesterday's pre-USIB in conjunction with the SWS discussion. I have been advised that [] has drafted and coordinated a response which will be forwarded to you shortly for signature.

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
[] Ex. Sec., USIB	31 Oct 75

Approved For Release 2004/12/21 : CIA-RDP91M00696R0006015000